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Abstract
This paper discusses prominent examples of what we call ‘‘algorithmic anxiety’’ in artworks engaging with algorithms.
In particular, we consider the ways in which artists such as Zach Blas, Adam Harvey and Sterling Crispin design artworks
to consider and critique the algorithmic normativities that materialize in facial recognition technologies. Many of the
artworks we consider center on the face, and use either camouflage technology or forms of masking to counter the
surveillance effects of recognition technologies. Analyzing their works, we argue they on the one hand reiterate and reify
a modernist conception of the self when they conjure and imagination of Big Brother surveillance. Yet on the other hand,
their emphasis on masks and on camouflage also moves beyond such more conventional critiques of algorithmic
normativities, and invites reflection on ways of relating to technology beyond the affirmation of the liberal, privacy-
obsessed self. In this way, and in particular by foregrounding the relational modalities of the mask and of camouflage, we
argue academic observers of algorithmic recognition technologies can find inspiration in artistic algorithmic imaginaries.
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Introduction: Capturing face
This chapter discusses prominent examples of what we
call ‘‘algorithmic anxiety’’ in artworks engaging with
algorithms. In particular, we consider the ways in
which artists such as Zach Blas, Adam Harvey and
Sterling Crispin design artworks to consider and cri-
tique the algorithmic normativities that materialize in
facial recognition technologies. Many of the artworks
operating with, and on, algorithmic anxiety center on
the face, and use either camouﬂage technology or forms
of masking to counter the surveillance eﬀects of recog-
nition technologies. We argue here that face, mask, and
camouﬂage ﬁgure so prominently in thematizations of
algorithmic anxiety because they illuminate the ways
algorithmic technologies (re)conﬁgure identity and sub-
jectivity. We suggest that an assessment of the complex
relationality of these concepts allows for a better under-
standing both of algorithmic anxiety and of the politics
of algorithmic facial recognition technologies.
An ‘‘anti-facial recognition movement is on the
rise,’’ writes Joseph Cox for The Kernel (2014).
It is perhaps premature to speak of a ‘‘movement,’’
but indeed a growing number of artists has expressed
anxiety about the alleged ubiquitous implementation
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and dissemination of facial and identity recognition
technologies.
When contemporary artists engage with facial rec-
ognition algorithms their works—and this should not
surprise many—often center on the human face. In
particular masks and camouﬂage wear have emerged
as a response to facial recognition technology. They
are exhibited in international art shows, both as art
and design projects, and as a socio-technical commen-
tary. Some masks and camouﬂage wear is also com-
mercially available as gear that provides access to
potentially subversive modalities of being public; it is
sold with the promise that it undercuts or confuses
facial recognition algorithms. In Western societies
the face plays a central role in human interaction
(Ingold, 2000; Napier, 1986). For this reason, commu-
nicative interaction in physical presence is often
described as talking ‘‘face-to-face’’—a concept
extended by platforms such as Skype and FaceTime.
Interaction, as Goﬀman has famously said, is always
also about avoiding ‘‘being in wrong face’’ or ‘‘being
out of face’’ and about ‘‘saving face.’’ What he calls
‘‘maintenance of face’’ is thus a condition of human
interaction. And hence what he terms ‘‘face work,’’
‘‘the actions taken by a person to make whatever he
is doing consistent with face,’’ is a key part of any
interaction (Goﬀman, 1967: 12). Goﬀman thus uses
‘‘face’’ in a relational sense, deﬁning it as ‘‘the positive
social value a person eﬀectively claims for himself by
the line others assume he has taken during a particular
contact. Face is an image of self delineated in terms of
approved social attributes’’ (5). Because of this cen-
trality of the face in interaction, it is at the same
time an ambiguous phenomenon: it is both a screen
that permits an assumed ‘‘internal’’ state to be seen,
and a cloak that conceals, as when secrets are hidden
behind a ‘‘straight face’’ (1974: 216).1
Likely because of its centrality in interaction, the
face is central in political battleﬁelds over socio-techni-
cal change, too. It should perhaps be no surprise that
one of the biggest ongoing privacy battles is waged over
a platform called Facebook. Or witness, for instance,
the debates around the biometric passport in the EU,
the media frenzy, in mainly the UK and the US in the
Fall of 2017, after the publication of a study from
Stanford University which found that facial recognition
technology could detect sexual orientation from facial
images,2 or the concern about the use of facial image
processing software that could be used to generate and
disseminate the so-called portmanteau ‘‘deepfake’’
videos—i.e. convincing fake news. Less sophisticated
facial image processing technology is used in popular
apps such as Face Swap, Face Stealer, MSQRD, which
allow users to take a portrait picture and swap their
face with that of a friend, or any other person, or
animal. Similar by-products of the (in)famous selﬁe cul-
ture involve apps such as Fat Booth and Meitu, which
allow users to ‘‘beautify’’ or ‘‘cartoonify’’ their selﬁes.
Apps like these made the news both for the amount of
data they extract from user’s phones and for being the
latest form of auto-proﬁling. For some years now
Apple and Facebook have been adding to the main-
streaming of the use of facial recognition technology.
In case of the latter by way of its photo tagging fea-
tures, and Apple’s iPhone X has a feature that unlocks
your phone after recognizing your face as a security
check. Similarly, in the summer of 2018 MasterCard
launched its biometric card which uses biometric and
facial recognition technologies to verify the card-
holder’s identity. The diﬀerent machinations of faciality
outlined above—as a singular, unique, personal, and
identiﬁable security-check, as the imposition of a polit-
ical norm, as a plural, multiform, malleable, and
amendable canvas, as a means to play with identity,
and as a source of data extraction—indicate that
supra-individual cultural narratives and normativities
are braided around the socio-technical capture of
the face.
In the arts, ever since the portrait photography of
Ellis Island immigrants by Dorothea Lang, Walker
Evans, Arthur Rothstein and Gordon Parks, the face
undeniably has become a political landscape. In a way,
the mask and camouﬂage projects that form the subject
of this paper constitute a reversal of the classic artistic
tradition of portraiture and of the latest craze in the
selﬁe culture. It also seems to constitute a reversal, of
sorts, of what Mark BN Hansen dubbed the ‘‘digital-
facial-image’’ (DFI), with which he described a trend in
contemporary new media artworks that focused on the
digitally generated face. Leaning on Guattari and
Deleuze in their conception of facility and the face
machine, Hansen proposed his notion of DFI as ‘‘a
new paradigm for the human interface with digital
data’’ (2003: 205). The experience of the viewer’s
encounter with digitally generated images of a face,
and speciﬁcally the aﬀective correlate it generates in
the viewer, functioned as ‘‘the very medium for the
interface between the embodied human and the
domain of digital information’’ (205). These days, how-
ever, artists are less focused on generating digitally gen-
erated faces and more on generating masks and
camouﬂage couture using various forms of techno-
logical engineering. These works are less focused on
interaction with an assumed viewer and more focused
on hiding the face, covering it up, or in rendering it
unrecognizable to facial recognition technology.
Masks and the camouﬂage couture here function as a
mediation in the relations between the self, the face,
data algorithmically extracted from facial images, and
more abstract notions and preoccupations about what
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the future of algorithmic culture might entail for
humankind.
The aim of this paper is to unfold the narratives that
emerge from facial recognition technology, more spe-
ciﬁcally the algorithmically captured face, and manifest
into face masks and camouﬂage couture in contempor-
ary media art. We focus on the concerns about these
relations between the self, the face and a supposed algo-
rithmic culture, which are at the center of these artistic
imaginaries. We argue that what we call ‘‘algorithmic
anxiety’’ revolves around concern about the extent to
which we live our lives as imagined, self-transparent
subjects in relation to algorithmic technologies.
Algorithmic anxiety is not a sentimental subjectivity,
or a personal pathology related to one’s feelings regard-
ing algorithms. Instead, it revolves around the position
of the self in algorithmic culture. It questions the nor-
mative aﬀects of algorithmic culture on a self immersed
in a regime of visibility that itself remains largely invis-
ible. Questions concerning the conceptual understand-
ing of the self in relation this regime of visibility are the
focus of this analysis. If in 1999, Bill Gates could ask
‘‘what is it about sitting face to face that we need to
capture?’’ (quoted in Peters, 2015: 274), today it is clear
that there is something about the very practice of ‘‘cap-
turing face’’ that engenders an algorithmic anxiety.
In what follows, we ﬁrst introduce a number of
popular pieces of mask and camouﬂage couture.
Then, along the lines of Kierkegaard’s conception of
anxiety, we propose the concept of algorithmic anxiety
as a form of despair rooted in a lack of possibility. With
the concept of algorithmic anxiety in mind, we provide
a reading of speciﬁc artistic critiques of facial recogni-
tion algorithms that embed these technologies within
layered and interrelated historical, epistemological,
ontological constellations, and technological develop-
ments. This mix of lineages, inﬂuences, histories, and
orientations may serve as a guide to reimagine these
masking and camouﬂage project not as anxious defense
mechanisms against facial recognition technologies, but
rather as a Kierkegaardian desire for possibility oﬀer-
ing understandings of relationality attuned to life under
algorithmic observation.
Kierkegaard is not interested in anxiety as a state of
the mind, but in what the concept of anxiety reveals
about the self. In anxiety one becomes self-aware,
aware that one exists in relation: to our body, to our
abilities and inabilities, to the cognitive skills we have
and lack, to our surroundings, our family, our past and
future, the nation we inhabit, its culture, and the entire
history of humankind ([1844] 2014: 68). The self is a
synthesis, Kierkegaard writes, and this synthesis is a
relation ([1844] 2014: 88). In The Sickness Unto Death
([1849] 1983), Kierkegaard explains that he self is a
synthesis and composed of contrasting elements:
temporality and eternity, freedom and necessity, and
inﬁnitude and ﬁnitude ([1849] 1983: 30). The task is
to think these contrasting elements together, to attempt
to actualize them together. Existence is the never-
ending attempt to synthesize them. This attempt to syn-
thesis is however never fully realized, and although
some people are more successful than others, tension
and contradiction remains. One side of the opposite
may be emphasized over the other; one side may be
overdeveloped, the other underdeveloped, and in turn
the synthesis of opposite elements around which the self
coheres falls apart, instilling anxiety. In The Sickness
Unto Death Kierkegaard explains that a misrelation
between possibility and necessity and the ﬁnite and
the inﬁnite causes despair. He distinguishes diﬀerent
forms of despair by reﬂecting upon what each form
of despair lacks. He explains that when an individual
leans to inﬁnitude, the despair it feels is caused by a
lack of ﬁnitude. Similarly, the despair of ﬁnitude lacks
inﬁnitude; the despair of possibility lacks necessity, and
the despair of necessity lacks possibility ([1849] 1983:
30–42). These types of despair overlap and are
dynamic.
In a misrelation, when one leans to possibility, what
is missing is to submit ‘‘to what may be called one’s
limitations,’’ Kierkegaard writes ([1849] 1983: 36).
Many things are not up to us. To begin with, we
cannot freely choose our gender, ethnicity, the family
we are born in, our place of birth, as well as numerous
other things. A human being does not create itself—like
Sartre argued.3 Alas, life is not a supermarket, nor
string of fair and causal relations. The self is, therefore,
and perhaps not surprisingly, not an autonomous self.
Kierkegaard writes,
the self is a relation that relates itself to itself or is the
relation’s relating itself to itself in the relation; the self
is not the relation but is the relation’s relating itself to
itself to and in relating itself to itself. . . .The human self
is such derived, established relation, a relation that
relates itself to itself and in relating to itself it relates
to another. (1980: 13, 14)
The ‘‘another’’ is ‘‘that which established the entire
relation of the self to itself’’ which is not the self (13).
Kierkegaard stresses the importance of a self relating to
itself, to one’s limitations and possibilities. As we are
relational beings, we are not wholly transparent to our-
selves, nor to others, neither are others to us; something
always slips out of our grasp. We are inseparable from,
but cannot be reduced to, our relations, desires, anxi-
eties, and beliefs. Kierkegaard insists that there are no
universal answers to the nature of self, to the produc-
tions of our minds nor to our relations to the societies
we inhabit, just as there are no rule books to existence.
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That most of Kierkegaard’s books do not bear his
name attests to this insistence. His pseudonyms are
not made in jest, they emphasize that we lack a ‘‘time-
less,’’ ‘‘impersonal,’’ or ‘‘objective’’ view from nowhere
from which the self can be understood. The diﬀerent
viewpoints he embodies with diﬀerent pseudonyms and
personas attest to his conviction that a self is always
bounded and embedded in partial and timely relations.
What, then, is speciﬁc to what we propose to call
algorithmic anxiety? Algorithmic anxiety, we argue, is
about more than uncertainty and a lack of control in
the face of algorithms (as in Jhaver et al., 2018). It is
rather a more ‘‘existential’’ anxiety, as in Kierkegaard,
but this time an anxiety of the self that relates to itself
and in this self-relating it relates to the algorithmically
mediated realm of possibility and necessity.
Algorithmic anxiety seems to ﬂare up when normative
conceptions of subjectivity are perceived to be chal-
lenged by the capture of the face-by-facial recognition
algorithms. It is an anxiety concerning the very ques-
tion in relation to whom or what subjects constitute
themselves. It thus concerns anxiety over who partici-
pates in crafting observations, recognition, and
accounts of the self, where this takes place, and at
what consequences in terms of the aﬀordances of iden-
tities and the possibilities for being a subject it might
bring about. According to Kierkegaard, situations that
evoke anxiety are undetermined, vague and unstilted,
and defy knowledge, causation and rationalization. The
question, for Kierkegaard, is how one relates to such
situations, how one positions itself in relation to it.
Algorithmic culture could be described as evoking anx-
iety in relation to the future disposition of the self. This
is a normative concern through and through, as it per-
tains to what one should or might be and do. As Judith
Butler has argued, giving an account of the self is an
intricate part of subject formation (2005, 2015). And,
she argues, such accounts always relate to norms, and
so the very ‘‘substance’’ of the self always already
relates to normative demands. In analyzing artistic ima-
ginaries of technologies of algorithmic facial capture,
we thus seek to contribute to an understanding of algo-
rithmic normativities as ways of calibrating subjectiv-
ities. Algorithms are imagined to ‘‘do’’ something to the
‘‘self’’, and that is both why algorithmic anxiety sur-
rounds such technologies, and why that anxiety pro-
vides a window on the socio-technically entangled
relationality through which subjects begin to imagine
themselves in the ﬁrst place. In what follows, we intro-
duce three artistic imaginaries of facial recognition
algorithms that we analyze in the following sections.
As we will argue, what is at stake in algorithmic anxiety
is an uncertain and perilous relation of the self in rela-
tion to facial recognition systems, oscillating between
conceptions of possibility and necessity. The masks and
the patterns of camouﬂage provide the point of entry
into this relation.
Anti-facial recognition masks and
camouflage: Three cases of algorithmic
anxiety in the artistic imagination of
algorithms
Artist and scholar Zach Blas’ series of mask projects are
designed to on the one hand visualize how identity rec-
ognition technology analyses human faces, and to resist
identity recognition technology by oﬀering an undetect-
able face masks. His FacialWeaponization Suite are series
of amorphous masks designed and produced during com-
munity workshops, geared at Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual,
Trans and Intersex (LGBTIþ) and minority groups.
These masks, by virtue of their form and cryptographic
material, will not be recognized as a face by identity rec-
ognition software. Identity recognition technology, as
Blas sees it, ‘‘control[s] through an optical logic of
making visible’’ to ‘‘police and criminalize populations
all over the world’’ (2014). His masks represent a resist-
ance towhat he calls ‘‘informatic visibility’’ which is redu-
cing us to mere ‘‘aggregates of data’’ (2014).
Technologist and artist Adam Harvey has a diﬀer-
ent approach. With HyperFace he designed camou-
ﬂage couture which aims to confuse facial
recognition systems. His couture does so by presenting
these systems with countless false positives. HyperFace
is a textile print that identity recognition technology
detects as a face. The patterns are based on ideal-type,
models, of algorithmic representations of a human face.
HyperFace, he explains, is ‘‘a new kind of camouﬂage
that aims to reduce the conﬁdence score of facial detec-
tion and recognition by providing false faces that dis-
tract computer vision algorithms’’ (Harvey, 2017). ‘‘[It]
aims to alter the surrounding area . . . [and] oﬀers a
higher conﬁdence score for a false face by exploiting
a default in certain algorithmic systems for the highest
conﬁdence score’’ (2017). HyperFace reduces the conﬁ-
dence score of the true face (ﬁgure) by redirecting more
attention to the nearby false face regions. In an inter-
view, Harvey states that his projects are motivated by
concerns about how computer vision will be used ‘‘to
extract knowledge without the cooperation or consent
of an individual,’’ and that facial recognition technol-
ogy ‘‘poses a signiﬁcant threat to privacy’’ (quoted in:
Samuels, 2017). He explains that what motivated this
work is that he feels that somebody is watching him in
his day-to-day activities, ‘‘that you always have a chap-
erone,’’ someone who looks over your shoulder
(Harvey, 2014).
The Data-Masks of the artist and technologist
Sterling Crispin have been produced by reverse
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engineering facial recognition algorithms. His face
masks are 3D printed masks that visualize what
robust models recognition and detection algorithms
recognize and detect as a face—what passes as a face
online. They ‘‘show the machine what it’s looking for,’’
hold up a mirror to the machine (Crispin, 2014). These
Data-Masks are ‘‘animistic deities, brought out of the
algorithmic spirit-world of the machine and into our
material world, ready to tell us their secrets, or warn
us of what’s to come’’ (2013). Crispin writes about how
we are ‘‘always already being seen, watched and ana-
lyzed’’ by what he calls a ‘‘Technological Other,’’ that is
‘‘peering into our bodies’’ (2014).
The work of these artists has been widely exhibited
in museums, galleries, art institutions, and at festivals
and conferences in Europe, the US and the UK, and
each of these projects has garnered a fair deal of media
attention in the international press and by magazines
and blogs that discuss digital media culture. And each
of these projects is speciﬁcally aimed at facial recogni-
tion technology—diﬀerent from other mask projects
that engage with online or and oﬄine anonymity, priv-
acy in relation to political activism and in general.4
More often than not, these projects are framed as art-
istic responses to surveillance, as surveillance art.
Masks and camouﬂage wear, too, are often understood
merely as counter-surveillance strategies. Here, we
interpret these mask and camouﬂage projects as diﬀer-
ent modes of algorithmic anxiety relating to the dissem-
ination of algorithmic facial recognition systems,
a characteristic of an algorithmic culture. In these
explorations we aim to account for the conception of
self in relation to these anxieties. Why take the route of
concealment strategies? What imperatives shape and
underpin these designs? What forms of relating to
facial recognition technology does it privilege?
Camouflage and the mask: Concepts of
entanglement
To mask is to camouﬂage, a tactic to disappear from
view. In Hide and Seek: Camouﬂage, Photography, and
the Media of Reconnaissance, Hannah Rose Shell
argues that camouﬂage is a way of ‘‘not showing up,’’
to appear to disappear, to recede into the background,
to become invisible (2012: 10). The objective is to min-
imize the diﬀerence between ﬁgure and ground, object
and environment. Crucially, however, camouﬂage does
not so much pertain to complete invisibility, but rather
to becoming unrecognizable. Camouﬂage involves both
revealing and concealing (Leach, 2006: 244). It is thus a
tactic of invisibility through visibility.5 This play
between the visible and the invisible in camouﬂage dis-
plays its entanglement with both art and warfare, as
both share the desire to explore the limits of vision,
and importantly with the entanglement of a subject
with its socio-technical environment. Shell recounts
how diﬀerent historical forms of camouﬂage were
developed in tandem with artists, using diﬀerent
media from painting to ﬁlm (2012). What all forms of
camouﬂage have in common, is the shared concern with
the blurring of boundaries between self and environ-
ment. Likewise, contemporary army uniforms are
camouﬂaged as to be ‘‘disruptive’’: their ‘‘purpose is
to make it diﬃcult for the eye to discern the edges
and contours of the wearer’s form. They are designed
not to look like bark, grass and leaves which is the
paradigm of the old camouﬂage, but rather to dissolve
into formless dapples of detritus, light and shadow’’
(Swedberg, 2007). Both in traditional forms of camou-
ﬂage and in the contemporary artistic camouﬂage
forms described here, camouﬂage is aimed at blurring
boundaries: the point of giving oﬀ bark and leaves was
always to blur the boundary between self and environ-
ment, to escape from vision by an adversary or some
medium of capture. And so camouﬂage is as much a
concept of entanglement as it is of concealment. This,
too, follows Roger Caillois’s classic description of cam-
ouﬂage. Writing about ‘‘mimicry and legendary psy-
chasthenia’’ Caillois discussed camouﬂage as the loss
of boundaries of the self in terms of natural phenomena
of concealment, noting in particular a form of ‘‘deper-
sonalization by assimilation to space’’ (Caillois and
Shepley, 1984). Camouﬂage always concerns a desire
to escape from vision by something or someone, and
a play with relations between self, environment, and a
medium of vision. At the same time, as Hannah Rose
Shell notes, camouﬂage is ‘‘a form of cultivated subject-
ivity’’ (2012: 19).
Masks, too, have historically been among the
primary media through which subjectivities have been
cultivated. In fact, the concept of person comes from
the Latin persona, denoting a theatrical mask. Less well
known is that persona is a more complex concept alto-
gether. It signiﬁes movement and sound, a sounding
through the face, literally a form of per sonare. The
theatrical concept of the persona stands for both the
mask and for the part played, but also for the face.
Masks gain their connotations of ingenuity and of
being antithetical to true, interior identities from later
medieval, interpretations (Napier, 1986: 6–9). These
connotations can still be found in the English language
in expressions like ‘‘to show your true face’’, ‘‘put on a
brave face’’. In Greek physical theater, for example,
masks symbolized a certain character, but as masks
transﬁx facial expressions, they divert attention from
the face to the body, to its composure, how it moves
around in space. In physical theater, where emphasis is
laid on the embodiment of the narrative and on imagin-
ing narrative spaces through the body, the expressive
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face is seen as a possible distraction and obstacle to that
end. Japanese conceptions of masks, known for
instance in no and kabuki plays, have been discussed
as much more complex than simply the concealment of
an interior self. Sakabe Megumi has for instance noted
that in Yamato Japanese the word for mask and for
face was one and the same: omote. And, he argues, the
related notion of omo-zashi (the features of the face)
makes clear that this conception of the face is always
already relational, as it involves both that which is seen
by the other and that which sees itself. According to
Megumi ‘‘omote is evidently the structure of the mask
(. . .), but at the same time it is also the structure of the
face. The reason is that the face also is what is seen by
the other, what sees itself, and what sees itself as an
other’’ (1999: 245). Crucially, omote refers to the struc-
ture of a surface, but a surface without original. Its
relationality pertains not to hypostatized ‘‘personal’’
selves, but to a surface play of reﬂections. Likewise,
discussing animal masks among Inuit and Yup’ik
people of Alaska, Tim Ingold notes that ‘‘there is no
face peering out from behind the mask. In eﬀect the
identity of the human mask-bearer is not so much dis-
guised as displaced by the mask he carries’’ (2000: 124).
With these diﬀerent conceptions and histories in
mind, we propose to consider the engagement with
masks and camouﬂage by the artists introduced
above. Camouﬂage is here not a literal form of invisi-
bility, it is ﬁrst and foremost a form of unrecognizabil-
ity. As a countermeasure to the anxiety facial
recognition algorithms induce, tactics of unrecogniz-
ability are mobilized. Anxiety about the disposition of
the self in relation to facial recognition technology is
assuaged by unrecognizability, by concealment, in
becoming undetectable and unidentiﬁable to identity
recognition technology, by way of camouﬂage. Blas,
Harvey, and Crispin maintain that one can undermine
being captured by recognition technology by becoming
unrecognizable to it. The question most relevant at the
level of the social imaginary, we argue, will be what
concept of relationality and entanglement is operative
in the deployment of masks and camouﬂage by the art-
ists discussed here. In order to answer that, we ﬁrst
explore from what power they desire to become
imperceptible.
Black boxing the self
Kathryn Schulz writes: ‘‘[T]he dream of invisibility is
not about attaining power but escaping it’’ (2015).
According to the campaigns of many social movements
of the past 60 years visibility, in the form of recognition
of identity, is a precondition for emancipation, and
thus representation and power. For these artists, how-
ever, invisibility is less of a condition to be overcome
and more a precondition of the possibility of empower-
ment. Where identity and recognition politics are trad-
itionally about becoming recognized and visible—as
visibility and recognition is the privilege of the white
male and dominant class—here, unrecognizability is
regarded as politically empowering. Obviously, the
shapes and patterns that subvert algorithmic detection,
through masks and textile, are hyper-visible, make you
stand out in a crowd. It then seems ironic that these
hyper-visible camouﬂage projects are designed by
white, Western, tech-savvy, educated men; an already
highly recognized and visible identity. Within these art-
istic imaginaries, however, being visible and recogniz-
able has to do with automated administration, with
technological detection, with being monitored, pin-
pointed and identiﬁed, in the interest of others, and
this time directed not predominantly at colonial sub-
jects but including, precisely, white, tech-savvy, edu-
cated men. From what do these artists imagine to hide?
Blas his Facial Weaponization masks aim to avoid
becoming visible to recognition technology, which he
associates with the control and policing of in particular
minority groups. This controlling and policing he sug-
gests happens by way of data aggregation via recogni-
tion technology. Harvey’s HyperFace garment aims to
prevent the extraction of knowledge by way of recog-
nition technology, which he associates with a threat to
privacy. And Crispin’s Data-Masks aim to visualize
machine vision, a vision he associates with being
‘‘seen through’’ by an technological Other. According
to Crispin ‘‘we live under the shadow of a totalitarian
police state . . .’’ (2014). He claims we are ‘‘witnessing
the rise of a Globally Networked Technological
Organism’’ that will ‘‘exceed the human mind,’’ and
that the ‘‘human is lost in all this’’ (2014). For
Harvey the problem is the ‘‘imbalance of power
between the surveillant and the surveilled [sic]’’
(2013). It is the ‘‘ubiquitous and unregulated proﬁling
and cataloguing aspect’’ of these identiﬁcation technol-
ogies that he considers a threat to privacy (2013). Blas
fears that ‘‘the global standards’’ recognition technol-
ogy relies on ‘‘return us to the classist, racist, sexist
scientiﬁc endeavors of the nineteenth century’’ and
lead toward ‘‘Total Quantiﬁcation’’ annihilating ‘‘alter-
ity’’ (2014). Algorithmic culture is associated with a
police state, with classism and racism, with a dehuma-
nizing organism, and with being catalogued like a pro-
prietary object. What evokes anxiety is the possibility
of powerlessness, the possibility of being exposed, iden-
tiﬁed and characterized, being surpassed and over-
powered by a Technological Other, being
discriminated against and judged on the basis of num-
bers according to set standards. Whether it is capital-
ism, asymmetric power relations or technological
rationality, all three are anxious about future possible
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scenarios of algorithmic identity recognition technol-
ogy and the disposition of the self therein, and all
three are interested in creating ‘‘spaces’’ of invisibility,
opacity, or unrecognizability.
What do these zones of unrecognizability provide
that otherwise is lost to facial recognition systems?
Harvey’s camouﬂage projects claim to provide ‘‘more
control over your privacy’’ by ‘‘protecting your data’’
(2013). Crispin caters to the supposed needs of pro-
testors. His Data-Masks are ‘‘intended for use in acts
of protest and civil disobedience,’’ and are themselves
‘‘an act of political protest’’ by means of ‘‘giving form
to an otherwise invisible network of control’’ (2014).
Blas sees his masks as a tool in the tradition of collect-
ive protest movements like Anonymous, the Zapatistas
and Pussy Riot. ‘‘Facelessness and becoming imper-
ceptible are serious threats to the state and to capital-
ism,’’ Blas claims in a video Communique´ (Blas quoted
in Cox, 2014). He calls for ‘‘radical exits that open
pathways to self-determination and autonomy’’ (Blas,
2016: 47). It thus appears that, to these artists, to be
‘‘seen’’ is to be recognized, and to be recognized is to be
analyzed, and to be analyzed is to be reduced to infor-
mation. This information is in turn used by states and
corporations as the primary tool to gain and maintain
power. This power is expressed in the inﬂuence it alleg-
edly exerts over one’s behavior.
This form of imagination is comparable to a variety
of approaches to algorithms in academic studies. Frank
Pasquale, for example, is worried about the social
implications of the invisible and secretive algorithmic
practices of companies and governments that hide the
way people are labeled and treated (Pasquale, 2015a: 3).
He argues for transparency and intelligibility of these
systems (Pasquale, 2015a: 217). ‘‘As we are treated
algorithmically (i.e., as a set of data points subject to
pattern recognition engines), we are conditioned to
treat others similarly,’’ he cautions (Pasquale, 2015b).
Or, as Stefania Milan puts it ‘‘creators, owners and
exploiters of algorithms control much of our digital
life’’ and ‘‘deeply inﬂuence our ways of making sense
of interpersonal and spatial interactions. . . . altering our
perception of self and our relational being-in-the-
world,’’ she observes (Milan, 2016: 22). ‘‘Individuals,’’
she fears ‘‘become merely a pile of data’’ (22). Similarly,
Anselm Franke et al. argue in Nervous Systems:
Quantiﬁed Life and the Social Question (2016) that
every individual, locked inside algorithmic ﬁlter bub-
bles, ‘‘becomes a digit, a dot, a self-entered data
point,’’ a ‘‘statistical aggregate’’ (Franke, 2016: 14,
22). In The Black Box Society (Pasquale, 2015a)
Pasquale writes about how algorithms deployed on
the labor market change how we are seen, as individ-
uals. And in We Are Data: Algorithms and the Making
of our Digital Selves (Cheney-Lippold, 2017), John
Cheney-Lippold observes that data analytics ﬁrms
may mark an employee as ‘‘high cost’’ or as ‘‘unreliable
worker,’’ without one’s knowledge or participation
(Cheney-Lippold, 2017: 4). Cheney-Lippold contends
‘‘who we are in the face of algorithmic interpretation
is who we are computationally calculated to be’’ (6).
Who you are, he writes, is decided by advertisers, mar-
keters, and governments’ their secretive, proprietary
algorithmic scripts, recasting identity ‘‘into the exclu-
sive, private parlance of capital or state power’’ (6).
According to Matteo Pasquinelli this amounts to a
new landscape of knowledge: ‘‘the magnitude of this
epistemic revolution is comparable to previous para-
digm shifts, displacing the centrality of the human’’
(Pasquinelli, 2016: 281).
To imagine facial recognition algorithms, by exten-
sion, to have this power-knowledge, presumes a par-
ticular understanding of the self and a certain
understanding facial recognition algorithms. It is
feared that, reeled a certain way, the alleged power of
algorithms may nudge people into amiable, docile tools
for those in whose interests recognition technology sys-
tems operate. This biopower ascribed to facial recogni-
tion systems ﬂows from its collecting and using of
information the captured face gives access to. The
form of biopower that information collection exerts is
imagined in diﬀerent ways. Blas fears an algorithmic
culture in which LGBTIþ and minority groups are
excluded, not considered, treated with indiﬀerence
and regarded as inferior and having little or no say in
the course of action in their lives. Harvey fears being
itemized, listed, valued only in relation to the whole and
not individually. Crispin’s fears the loss of authority,
being ineﬀectual and being objectiﬁed by an other
organism that has no concern for who he is. He
argues that these networked systems ‘‘see human
beings as abstract things, patterns, and numbers, not
as individual people whose lives matter’’ (Crispin,
2014).
Algorithmic anxiety could be read as another kind of
dystopian technological imaginary. Wendy Chun for
instance observes that ‘‘paranoid narratives of Big
Brother’s all-seeing and all-archiving eye are similarly
agoraphobic. They too mark as ideal noninvasive,
happy spaces . . .The info-paranoid respond to the cur-
rent ‘‘public’’ infrastructure . . . by creating private (that
is, secret) spaces or cloaks, within which they hope to
be invisible’’ (Chun, 2006: 255). The artists seems to
suggest that to safeguard the self from the all-seeing
and all-archiving eye of algorithmic culture, what is
needed is to thwart facial recognition technology.
Indeed, such an imagination, as Hans Harbers argues,
echoes ‘‘the endemic Romantic narrative of despair of
being overrun by a technological juggernaut, which is
guided only by instrumental values . . .’’ (2005: 12).
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However, looking at these works through a
Kierkegaardian lens, a diﬀerent narrative emerges. It
could be argued the despair of the artists lacks possi-
bility, it lacks a sense of the inﬁnite. A person who
grounds itself in ﬁnitude, Kierkegaard explains, is over-
whelmed by a daunting sense of constriction and limi-
tation. He writes, that ‘‘the determinist, the fatalist, is in
despair . . . because for him everything has become
necessity. He is like that king who starved to death
because all his food was changed to gold.’’ (SUD: p.
40). A balance needs to be found between a grounding
in necessity, and in the desire for self-transcendence, in
possibility. And the imagination, ‘‘instar omnium,’’ is
what leads a person out into the inﬁnite (SUD: p. 31).
Kierkegaard compares the synthesis between possibility
and necessity with breathing, an inhaling and an exhal-
ing: both are needed in order to live. The determinist,
he explains, cannot breathe because one cannot live of
necessity alone. And the fatalist has no hope because he
lost his God, as his God is necessity (p. 40). In order to
breathe and not be overwhelmed or overrun by recog-
nition technology, the Romantic humanism of the art-
ists lacks possibility. This raises the question: how to
strike a diﬀerent balance between necessity and
possibility?
Camouflaged and masked dividuals
For Crispin and Harvey, algorithmic identiﬁcation tech-
nologies provide an entry-point to corrupt and inhibit
what is considered to be a private and independent self, a
self that by way of these technologies risks to become
objectiﬁed as a means to unknown ends. Identity, under-
stood as that part of the self where autonomy and inde-
pendence reside, is at stake and at loss to facial
recognition systems, Crispin and Harvey fear. Blas
aims to provide ‘‘informatic invisibility’’ which he
describes as ‘‘a means of resistance against the state
and its identity politics’’ (2016: 46). To resist the identity
politics of the state is to defy its social normalizing tech-
niques for indexing, regulating, and managing human
behavior and identity that have been ‘‘predetermined
by a multifarious conglomerate of corporate, military,
and state interests,’’ within which ‘‘identity is reduced
to disembodied aggregates of data’’ (45). Such a politics
of rubrics and disembodiment, he states ‘‘always enacts a
politics of reduction and exclusion’’ and ‘‘annihilates
opacity’’ (48). Anxiety, Kierkegaard teaches us, is
about lack, and lack is about desire. More than about
thwarting facial recognition technology, these projects
allude to the desire of being worthy, avowed, included,
understood, valued, endorsed, or acknowledged—in
short, a longing to be recognized and seen by others.
Rather than an autonomous, independent, powerful
individual, the self in relation to algorithmic culture is
experienced as relational, dependent, vulnerable,
unsteady, malleable. And this ‘‘is always fraught with
danger. . . . of contempt, of censure, or some judgment,
or recognition, of challenge, of annihilation. But most of
all, I think, we fear the visibility without which we
cannot truly live’’ (Lorde, 42).
Considering these projects in more detail, tacitly but
poignantly, complex connections between software,
self, and environment are brought to the surface, con-
nections that, in a way, may be productively under-
stood to remind liberal subjects, produced under
conditions of the disavowal of their entangled being,
of their relationality. Through the play with masks
and the dissolving of self and environment, connections
are made that invite viewers to mobilize a critical per-
ception of human and machine relations, opening up an
artistic space which challenges dominant understand-
ings of a self and allows for a diﬀerent way of relating
to algorithmic culture. Masks and camouﬂage, as we
argued above, always already presuppose entangle-
ment. Therefore, as Ingold notes, ‘‘the mask is not a
disguise intended to hide the identity of the bearer’’
(2000: 123). Rather, practices of masking and camou-
ﬂage intervene in the way the self becomes visible in
relation to the self, others and to its environment in
the ﬁrst place. To avoid being captured by recognition
algorithms, camouﬂage provides a way to vanish in the
background, to non-identity. In the triad between self,
environment and medium of capture, the self merges
with its environment to the eﬀect that it cannot be
captured.
HyperFace keeps the face of its wearer unrecogniz-
able by way of modifying the immediate surroundings
of one’s face. The print-designs ﬂood or overwhelm
recognition systems with false positives, with false
faces. Harvey’s HyperFace could be considered as a
form of ‘‘depersonalization by assimilation to space,’’
as we noted above, and as a way as to vanish in the
crowd. Today, it has become increasingly diﬃcult to
hide within the crowd: cityscapes are dotted with state
and corporate ‘‘gazes’’ in the form of CCTV and secur-
ity cameras, recognition technologies, sensors, and
monitors that assume constant observation and identi-
ﬁcation in public space. HyperFace provides its wearer
the condition of possibility to become a crowd. By
sauntering the city wearing HyperFace textiles it could
be argued Harvey ‘‘overturns the principle of being a
citizen into a being hiding from itself and losing himself
in the crowd’’ (Isin, 2002: 224). Or in the words of
Brecht: ‘‘Man [sic] does not become man [sic] again
by stepping forth from the masses but by sinking
deeper into them,’’ (quoted in Jonsson, 2013: 160).
For Brecht, an individual belongs to several collectives,
and is therefore divisible. This notion of the dividual is
made explicit in the work of Harvey. The individual
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wearer of Harvey’s HyperFace couture presents itself to
recognition technologies as a crowd, it represents an
individual as a multitude.
Let us turn to the Facial Weaponization series of
Blas. He designed his series of masks from the aggre-
gated data of participants that attended the community
workshops that he organized. The pink amorphous
blob of his Facial Weaponization series, for instance,
has been generated from the data of the faces of par-
ticipants who self-identiﬁed as gay, the black masks by
the aggregated data of participants who self-identiﬁed
as black. The aim of Blas’s masks is to provide ‘‘opa-
city,’’ a concept he derived from the poet E´douard
Glissant ([1997]2014). Glissant famously asserted ‘‘the
right to opacity’’ (189). Here, opacity stands in contra-
distinction to the West’s ‘‘old obsession’’ with ‘‘dis-
covering what lies at the bottom of natures’’ and its
‘‘requirement for transparency’’ (190). Glissant con-
tends that ‘‘opaqueness is to be opposed to any
pseudo-humanist attempt to reduce us to the scale of
some universal value, to any imposition of universal
models on singularities’’ (191). Blas associates the
‘‘recognizing’’ that algorithmic facial recognition sys-
tems do with imposed transparency. With his series of
masks Blas addresses who is made ‘‘informatically vis-
ible’’ pointing to the uneven rights and advantages
enjoyed by some and lacked by other so-called minority
groups in society. Some faces cannot disappear in a
crowd, some faces are more vulnerable than others,
some faces are feared, criminalized, and instrumenta-
lized before they are recognized by algorithms. With the
series he attempts to ‘‘weaponize’’ against imposed
transparency, by oﬀering the possibility to equip the
face with a way of opting out and escaping from the
logic of the visible. His masks are a desire to ‘‘let exist
as such that which is immeasurable, unidentiﬁable non-
identiﬁable, and unintelligible in things’’ (Blas, 2016:
48). This laissez exister is imagined as a possibility
which is possible only in safe spaces that are free
from technologies of informatic visibility, in short
only in protected and closed-oﬀ spaces. The ‘‘ideal of
peace and quiet’’ is here produced by engaging masks
as a weapon in combat against an imagined and exter-
nalized inﬂuencing machine (Colomina, 1991/1992: 7).
However, it is by virtue of this ‘‘free zone’’ between
human and technological environment that the synthe-
sis between the two is foregrounded. The possibility of
individual alterity and singularity—externalized and
imagined as a form of negative liberty—appears to
stand in direct relation to, even depends on and is
tied to face capturing technologies of imagined capital-
ist and state-sanctioned standardization and
universalization.
Crispin’s Data-Masks could be read as ways to
‘‘actualize’’ the virtual. His ‘‘deities’’, as Crispin calls
them, represent the (pan)optical logic as a belief in
ghosts. The ‘‘believe’’ in recognition technology and
the data it spits out might very well turn out to be
the ghost of the twenty-ﬁrst century. His Data-Masks
conceal by way of mirroring; his masks reﬂect back and
‘‘hold a mirror up to the all-seeing eye of the digital-
panopticon’’ (Crispin, 2013). Invisibility understood as
unrecognizability is here achieved by way of swapping
one’s real face with a model. What is reﬂected in the
mirror Crispin holds up to identity recognition technol-
ogy is not Reality, but the Model. Identity recognition
technology is represented as a cat chasing its own tail.
Conclusion: Faces of possibility
In ‘‘Subject Without a Face’’ Marcus Steinweg sug-
gests: ‘‘We need to learn to do without identity. We
need to muster the courage to exist with more than
merely a thousand faces; by comprehending that sci-
ence is not everything. Life does not close in on itself.
The circle is broken’’ (2010). Instead of understanding
the face as a gate-way to identity and identity as some-
thing that we ‘‘are’’, ‘‘have’’, ‘‘posses’’, or ‘‘own,’’
Steinweg argues that we need to understand the self
as ‘‘a scene of continual self-exceedence. . . .The play
with masks, the dance of faces that dissolve into and
replace each other, it is the movement of life in its open-
ing up to other subjects. The face mediated between the
Other and me. An excessive variety of possibilities’’
(2010). Steinweg proposes an alternative understanding
of identity, however, one that lacks grounding in neces-
sity. The self is not an object for one s eyes, neither an
excessive variety of possibilities. It is not merely con-
tingent and inconsistent, it is also deﬁned, described
and limited. A relational understanding of the self
allows for an understanding of the self not as a being,
neither as some ﬁxed substance. A relational under-
standing of the self asks not what the self is, but what
can be done with it and how it comes to be in diﬀerent
contexts and settings. Masks and camouﬂage could be
seen as subverting the normative understanding of the
self. They oﬀer a subversive play with relations between
the public manifestation of the self, the viewing of the
self by the self and by an assumed Other, including both
the power relations in that space and a relation to the
possible. And power relations are key here. Although
never absolute, the possibilities of some faces seem lim-
itless while those of others are strictly limited.
Taken together, Harvey’s strategy of the collectiviza-
tion of the individual, Blas’ facial weaponry as a dem-
onstration of entanglement with facial recognition
technologies, and Crispin’s ghost busting, de-emphasize
the individual symbolized by the face including the
assumptions of origin, and instead foreground our rela-
tional entanglement and alignment with others, our
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environment, and with that which established and tran-
scends the self and its environment, that what exceeds
science. Through these works an imaginary of the
human self appears as a dynamic relation in the syn-
thesis between the virtual and the actual, the social and
the material, possibility, and necessity. Seen this way,
the desire to isolate the self, to singularity and insular-
ity, to be sealed oﬀ from one’s surroundings, is co-
constituted by and inseparable from the dependency
and existential uncertainty, the desire of belonging
and to be recognized. To state it another way, algorith-
mic anxiety is a lack of balance between a desire for
autonomy, singularity and controlled isolation, and a
longing sense of belonging and existential certainty,
and to immerse oneself in a collective.
It is the experience of entanglement and the con-
comitant experience of limited control over one’s
future position in relation to algorithmic culture that
triggers anxiety and the desire for a closed oﬀ space, a
safe haven, a demarcated line between ‘‘inside’’ and
‘‘outside.’’ Algorithmic anxiety triggers the desire for
‘‘an island unto himself; a place where he controls his
own world—a world of . . . security, safety and privacy’’
(Colomina, 1991/1992: 7). Seen this way, algorithmic
anxiety is about the position of the self towards the
radical openness and unknowability of the future and
towards the regimes that attempt to close in on, narrow
and delineate the future.
However, by emphasizing one side of the synthesis
between opposites over the other gives room to algo-
rithmic anxiety to rise up, like a wall. As we have
explained above, for Kierkegaard, the self is not some-
thing one ‘‘has’’ or ‘‘possesses’’ nor the sum of its
rational decisions. And by extension, the self is not
something that can be rationalized or possessed by
other people and things. The self is a relation of that
which establishes relations of self-relating, over which
we and others have no control but that aﬀects us none-
theless. As the self is a synthesis of opposites and each
individual is tasked with a balancing act between these
opposites.6 The desire to overpower facial recognition
often conceals the desire to overpower the self, it often
masks the desire to be in possession of oneself and
overemphasizes the relation of the self towards facial
recognition technologies.
The Kierkegaardian task is to think, actualize, and
balance together the contrasting elements around which
the self coheres. Designed to symbolize protection
against and a critique of the perceived intrusion, poli-
cing, and controlling powers of recognition technology,
masks, and camouﬂage wear could be considered as
oﬀering an interventionist play with the desire for a con-
trolled environment, a transparent space where the indi-
vidual is in possession of itself and has the ﬁnal authority
in the situations it is in, in a context where individuals are
always already embedded and entangled in aﬀective
relations with their socio-technical environment. What
masks and camouﬂage wear oﬀer is an intervention in
the form of a kind of re-balancing between practices that
circumscribe, pin down, enclose, and encircle and prac-
tices those that move, open up, change and make ﬂuid.
The ember of algorithmic anxiety is stoked when we
latch on to the illusion that the individual is ‘‘the cre-
ator of its own fortune, yes, the creator of itself’’
(Kierkegaard, [1844] 2014: 393). This is what causes
anxiety, according to Kierkegaard. In Either/Or
Kierkegaard calls any attempt which maintains that
we are knowable and transparent to ourselves or to
others ‘‘ridiculous’’ (393). It is ridiculous because any
such attempt denies the existence of the unknown, any
such attempt is the denial of contingency, transcend-
ence, dependency, indeterminacy, and the denial of
the partiality of all knowledge. We are not transpar-
ent—neither to ourselves, nor to others, Kierkegaard
maintains.
Any attempt to ostracize, deny, or attempt to ‘‘plug’’
one side of the opposites that co-constitute the self, is
bound to cause anxiety. In fact, it is a lack of contin-
gency, disorder, and blurred borders that induces anx-
iety. Kierkegaard’s subject is situated, aware of its
ﬁnitude and limited perspective, aware of its task to
constantly maneuver between the opposites that consti-
tute the self, and aware of the dangers both of uncrit-
ically situating itself complacently in a normative
society and of speaking above it, of assuming autonomy
and of avoiding responsibility. It is precisely indeter-
minacy and uncertainty that allows for possibility,
because that what is ungraspable cannot be grasped
or captured or quantiﬁed, yet we stand in relation to it.
Kierkegaard saw the biggest threat and Achilles’ heel
in a society of individuals which has lost the awareness
of the limits of the mind, in a society that declared the
unknown dead and put reason on its throne. Instead of
assuming the underside of a dualism, instead of defend-
ing the modernist abstraction of the Autonomous
Subject, camouﬂage and masking gesture to relations
of mutual dependence, embeddedness, and entangle-
ment. It is these inherent contradictions and instability
that give way to possibility, of relating otherwise, and
of the multiplication of relations. The mask of anonym-
ity was traditionally used as a criticism of the self, in
order to liberate itself from the idea of the self.
However, as Kierkegaard reminds us, the self exceeds
‘‘the idea of the self.’’ It is by de-emphasizing auton-
omy, independence, and transparency—and in exten-
sion the personal and individual and the assumptions
of originality—that possibilities of collectivity and
collective belonging come into view that could
multiply avenues to work through algorithmic anxiety.
The full potential of the mask as a relational play
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between self and environment would allow moving
beyond hypostatizing conceptions of self and the algo-
rithmic other. Masks and camouﬂage may free us from
the anxiety of living one-sidedly as they allow for
the positing of a dividual as a synthesis in relation,
oﬀering a diﬀusion of subjectivity that opens up mul-
tiple ways of being, belonging and aligning that call for
an imagination that is not wedded to human–machine
dualisms, neither to the autonomous subject, nor to the
uncritical acceptance of the logic of algorithmic culture.
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Notes
1. The face, as central to the encounter with the other, has
been granted a key role in ethics, most famously in the
work of Levinas, who (like Goffman) considers the face
not as a part of the body, nor even as mere physical
appearance, but rather as ‘‘the way in which the other
presents himself, exceeding the idea of the other in me’’
(Levinas, 1969: 50; italics in original). In a similar vein,
Judith Butler has called attention to the politics of what
she calls ‘‘radical effacement’’, whereby certain people
never appear in a normative or political register because
they have been effectively ‘‘effaced’’, either through occlu-
sion or through representation, people whose suffering and
death therefore become ‘‘ungrievable’’ (2004).
2. See Yulin Wang and Michael Kosinski, ‘‘Deep neural net-
works are more accurate than humans at detecting sexual
orientation from facial images,’’ https://osf.io/zn79k/.
3. In Fear and Trembling he writes: ‘‘From the external and
visible work there comes as old adage: ‘‘Only one who
works gets bread’’. Oddly enough, the adage does not fit
the world in which it is most at home, for imperfection is
the fundamental law of the external world, and here it
happens again and again that he who does not work
does get bread, and he who sleeps gets even more abun-
dantly than he who works’’ (FT: p. 27). The idea that if
you do good, good will come to you is a falsity, according
to Kierkegaard. The external world ‘‘sighs under the law of
indifference’’ (FT: 27). Some people work their socks off,
are exploited, and have no bread to eat. Others do not do a
stroke of work and have their bellies full of bread.
Kierkegaard challenges the Christian equation of well-
being with virtue.
4. Such as the hackers collective Anonymous, and the work
of artists such as Mark Shepherd, Martin Backes, Kiri
Dalena, Peter Weibel, and Ingrid Burrington, to name
but a few.
5. Bauhaus artists La´szlo´ Moholy Nagy, who designed US
army equipment patterns (Dı´az, 2015: 68), and Oskar
Schlemmer were deeply interested in camouflage
(Schwartz, 1996), as was Picasso (Hartcup, 1979).
Georgy Kepes emphasized that all vision was a creative
way of shaping forms out of ‘‘a whirlwind of light quali-
ties’’ (1969: 15).
6. The safest route is to be a cog in the wheel, to lose oneself
in either side of opposites, in one-sidedness. In a life that
lacks possibility one does what society expects one to do,
and one thinks what the majority thinks. Security is found
in a job, a marriage, property, wealth or fame, and doing
what is considered ‘‘right’’—this is what Kierkegaard calls
‘‘living by the numbers.’’ However, according to
Kierkegaard, to assert one’s self requires a relation to pos-
sibility, the courage to speak above the crowd, separate is
from ought, and it requires persistence and a strong will.
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